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1. Introduction 
Psych verbs present several challenges to linguists, 
particularly with respect to linking and binding. Many accounts of 
psych verbs appeal to unaccusativity as an explanation for the 
puzzling behavior of the verbs. This paper uses data from child 
language to question the feasibility of such unaccusative analyses 
of psych verbs; " I argue that child language data indicate that 
children begin to distinguish between subjects as representing 
physical events and subjects as representing experienced events. 
This is consistent with work on children's developing theories of 
mind. 
2. Psych Verbs 
2.1 The Verbs 
The verbs of psychological state are verbs that are used 
primarily to describe states of mind or changes in states of mind 
(Levin 1993). These verbs include the words commonly used to 
express emotion, such as admire, enjoy, favor, fear, hate, like, 
love, miss, trust, amuse, amaze, anger, annoy, astonish, concern, 
disgust, frighten, please, surprise, worry among others (Levin 
1993). 
The verbs of psychological state are verbs with two arguments, 
typically called experiencer and theme (Belletti & Rizzi 1988; 
Grimshaw 1990) or experiancer and stimulus. They divide into two 
subgroups, each named after a representative class member. FEAR 
verbs link the experiencer argument to the subject position and the 
theme argument to the object position; FRIGHTEN verbs link the 
theme argument to the subject position and the experiencer argument 
to the object position. The examples in (1) illustrate this. 
(l)a. 
{l)b. 
The boy fears the dog. (EXP-THEME) 
The dog frightens the boy, (THEME-EXP) 
FRIGHTEN verbs also differ from FEAR verbs in that the events 
they denote are causative events in which "the stimulus causes the 
experiencer to enter the mental state" (Croft 1993:56). Most of 
the FRIGHTEN causatives are able to denote events with either 







The mask frightened the children. 
The man frightened the children. 
The book amused the children. 
The librarian amused the children. 
The concept of agency is important to linguistic analyses of 
psych verbs because only the non-agentive uses of FRIGHTEN verbs 
are known to exhibit unexpected behavior in the syntax, especially 
with respect to binding (Baker 1988b; Belletti & Rizzi 1988; 
Grimshaw 1990; Pesetsky 1987, 1992, and others). 
2.2 The Linking Problem and the Binding Problem 
There are · two problems associated with psych verbs: the 
linking problem and the binding problem. 
2.2.1. The Linking Problem 
Psych verbs appear to exhibit irregular linking patterns. 
Linking refers to the way in which meaning is used to map arguments 
to the grammatical functions of a predicate. These linking 
regularities (Carter 1988) are generally predictable, even across 
languages. Hypotheses which capture this regularity of linking 
patterns in a number of universally applicable principles include 
Baker's (1988a) Uniformity of Theta Assignment Hypothesis (UTAH). 
Such hypotheses are attractive from a language theorist's 
viewpoint, as these gene~alizations have both explanatory and 
predictive value (Pinker 1989; Pesetsky 1992): they attempt to 
explain and predict the ways in which arguments bearing particular 
semantic roles tend to link to the same syntactic positions. Yet 





Mary likes turnips. (EXP-THEME) 
Turnips please Mary. (THEME-EXP)· 
The man frightened the child. (AGENT-EXP) 
The mask frightene.d the child. (THEME-EXP) 
The pair of sentences (4) expresses the same or highly similar 
ideas, yet they link apparently identical arguments to different 
syntactic positions. The pair of sentences in (5) pose a problem 
for semantic-role based theories of linking in which roles are 
hierarchically related to one another. It is unusual from this 
perspective for the theme argument to map onto the subject position 
as it is lower on all thematic hierarchies than the experiencer 
argument. It is this problem in particular which this paper will 
address. 
2.2.2. The Binding Problem 
Binding Theory (Chomsky 1981) describes and predicts how 
referring expressions (nouns), pronominals, and anaphors relate to 
each other in sentences. Some acceptable uses of psych verbs 
appear to flout the principles of Binding Theory. FEAR verbs as 
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well as the agentive uses of FRIGHTEN verbs pattern in standard 
ways in the syntax, as the sentences in (6a) and (6b) illustrate; 
these sentences are not acceptable because they violate Principle A 
of Binding Theory, which requires the anaphor each other to be 
bound within its local domain. However, what Grimshaw (1990) calls 
the "non-agentive" uses of FRIGHTEN verbs, as in (6c) and (6d), 
seem to violate this principle. 
(6)a. *Each other's siblings love the two friends. 
(6)b. *Each other's parents deliberately frightened the 
children to teach them a lesson. (Baker 1988b) 
(6)c. Each other's health frightens the young lovers. 
(Baker 1988b) 
(6)d. Stories about herself generally please Mary. 
(Pesetsky 1987) 
The crucial matter to be examined is this: Why does the difference 
in the nature of the subject NP (that is, an agentive entity as 
compared to a non-agentive entity) apparently result in this 
flouting of binding theory for the FRIGHTEN verbs? 
3. Unaccusative Solutions 
Belletti & Rizzi (1988), Grimshaw (1990), and others (e.g. 
Pesetsky 1995; Pustejovsky 1995) approach the problems associated 
with psych verbs somewhat differently from one another, yet they 
rely to a greater or lesser extent on the notion of unaccusativity 
to solve the problems associated with psych verbs. Unaccusative 
accounts of psych verbs such as Belletti & Rizzi (1988) argue that, 
despite the surface differences in the realizations of the 
arguments of FEAR and FRIGHTEN verbs, the underlying 
representations are similar to one another in that, for both types 
of verbs, experiencer arguments in the ct-structure are structurally 
higher than theme arguments. The theme-subjects of non-agentive 
FRIGHTEN verbs are derived via a movement which leaves the 
experiencer argument in the object position. Unaccusative accounts 
such as Grimshaw (1990) see argument structure as the source of 
this unaccusativity. Where FEAR verbs and agentive FRIGHTEN verbs 
have the same kind of argument structure as typical transitive 
verbs, the non-agentive FRIGHTEN verbs have no external argument. 
The example in (7) summarizes the relevant aspects of both Grimshaw 
(1990) and Belletti & Rizzi (1988). Both accounts differentiate 
FRIGHTEN verbs with respect to agenti vi ty. FRIGHTEN verbs with 
agentive subjects have normal argument structures and normal 
linking patterns. FRIGHTEN verbs with non-agentive subjects are 
essentially different from agentive FRIGHTEN verbs in that their 
subjects are derived from an underlying position which is lower 
than that of the direct object. 
{7)a. The man frightened the children. 
AGENT EXPERIENCER 
Argument structure: x (y) 
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(7)b. The mask1 frightened the children (t1). 
THEME EXPERIENCER 
~----------------------------
Argument structure: (y,x) 
Unaccusative accounts of psych verbs, then, propose two entirely 
different verbs with the same phonological shape: agentive FRIGHTEN 
verbs and non-agentive FRIGHTEN verbs. Data from child language, 
however, raises questions for accounts such as these. 
4. Child Language Data 
Given the behavior of psych verbs described above, acquisition 
data would be expected to reflect the child's efforts to acquire 
this unusual group of verbs. Yet the exceptional representations 
which are attributed to psych verbs--particularly unaccusativity--
do not seem to be reflected in the rather unexceptional acquisition 
data for these verbs. 
4.1. Bowerman's Study 
Bowerman (1990) uses data from her diary study of her two 
daughters to argue that psych verbs provide evidence concerning the 
learning of linking rules. She claims that her daughters made no 
errors in linking with these verbs until the ages of six and eight. 
At that point, they began to switch patterns for low-frequency 
FEAR and FRIGHTEN verbs. For the most part, this involved using 
some FEAR verbs in the FRIGHTEN linking pattern. That is, they 
began to link the theme arguments of FEAR verbs to the subject 
position instead of the object position (1990:1284). 
(8) How does 'Hurly Girl' fancy you? (How do you 
fancy •.• ) (Christy, age 9;0) 
(9) It didn't mind me very much. (I didn't mind it ... ) 
(Eva, age 6; 2) 
(10) I saw a picture that enjoyed me. (that I enjoyed) 
(Eva, age 6; 6) 
The Bowerman data actually demonstrate that psych verbs were 
acquired quite unexceptionally by these children. There is, in 
fact, no evidence to indicate that FRIGHTEN verbs have two separate 
argument structures, or that the linking rules associating 
experiencers sometimes with objects, sometimes with subjects was 
problematic for these children. I argue this on several important 
points. 
First, errors with psych verbs were rare for Bowerman's 
children; indeed, when they were young, the children made no errors 
with psych verbs. In the early data (Bowerman 1990) with both FEAR 
and FRIGHTEN verbs, particularly like and scare, there were no 
linking errors at all. This fact also indicates that there were no 
special errors attributed to early learning of the unaccusative 
structures which have been associated with psychological FRIGHTEN 
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verbs, such as failure to raise the ct-structure object to s-
structure subject position. Deprez & Pierce (1991) report that, 
very early in the acquisition process, errors with unaccusative 
verbs tend to surface. That is, as much as 90% of the children's 
subject-less utterances at this age involve unaccusative verbs 
(Pierce 1991). Bowerman reports none of these errors with psych 
verbs. This suggests that psych verbs are largely acquired quite 
unexceptionally along with regular transitive verbs. Had these 
errors been evident, there would be independent support for the 
unaccusative analyses of Grimshaw (1990) and Belletti & Rizzi 
(1988). 
Secondly, the few errors that Bowerman did record occurred 
quite late and then largely with low-frequency verbs such as fancy; 
that is, the children did not generally make errors with more 
commonly occurring psych verbs such as love or frighten. 
Thirdly, at least half of the errors reported by Bowerman 
(1990) occurred with intransitive verbs in combination with 
prepositional phrases, such as approve of, react to, and appeal to, 
and in (11). (from Bowerman 1990:1284). 
(11) I don't appeal to that! (That doesn't appeal to 
me) Christy, age 7;0 
Because intransitive verbs generally signal non-causative meanings 
(Bowerman 1982), it makes perfect sense for the children to have 
used them within the more causative, transitive frame associated 
with FRIGHTEN verbs when the children wished to express a cause. 
Further explanation of these errors may come from the work of 
Naigles, Fowler & Helm (1992) and Naigles, Gleitman & Gleitman 
(1992), who investigated the establishment of argument structure 
within children across various age groups. They argue that, where 
children are likely to change the meaning of a verb, to shift its 
argument structure, or to accept a new argument structure for the 
verb, adults are less likely to do so. Adults and older children 
maintain the meaning of a verb as well as its argument structure 
and tend to alter what they hear to match what they already know. 
The researchers distinguish these two tendencies as Frame 
Compliance, where children accept the data they hear and adjust 
their lexicons accordingly, and Verb Compliance, where older 
children and adults do not accept what they hear, and tend to 
change the data to fit what they already know about a verb. These 
researchers conclude that, in using Noun-Verb-Noun sentence 
patterns, children tended to be Frame Compliant until age nine. 
After that age, they tended to become Verb Compliant. 
The conclusions of Naigles, Fowler & Helm (1992) may be 
applied to the Bowerman (1990) data. In constructing the novel 
utterances in (8-10), the Bowerman children were still at an age 
where they would be expected to experiment with meaning and with 
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argument structure at the cost of the syntactic pattern. Altering 
the argument structures of these psych verbs to fit what Bowerman 
calls a "statistically preponderant pattern" (1990:1285) or simply 
the accepted causative-transitive pattern is something that 
children might do while they are still Frame Compliant and not yet 
Verb Compliant. Given the exceptional representations attributed 
to these verbs by Belletti & Rizzi (1988), Grimshaw (1990) and 
Pesetsky (1995), and given the expectation that, under the age of 
nine, children easily alter linking patterns, linking errors with 
psych verbs would be expected. The remarkable thing about this 
error data with respect to current accounts of psych verbs is 
simply that there is not more of it. 
4.2. Tinker, Beckwith & Dougherty's Study 
Tinker, Beckwith & Dougherty (1989) describe an experiment 
that two of the authors performed with nursery school children in 
which they elicited responses to questions using, among others, 
psych verbs. The authors had expected the children to demonstrate 
some confusion with FRIGHTEN verbs, as these verbs are said to be 
syntactically "marked" as an odd subgroup of verbs, whereas the 
FEAR verbs are perceived as being quite regular transitive verbs 
(p. 254). Results indicated, however, that the children could use 
FRIGHTEN verbs correctly in active as well as passive sentences. 
The authors conclude that both the agentive and non-agentive 
FRIGHTEN verbs are, in fact, quite easily learned. 
In the Tinker, Beckwith & Dougherty analysis, it is because 
the FRIGHTEN verbs are causatives that children had no problem with 
them. They write, "the relevant feature ..• for children is the 
presence of an object affected by a cause in the situational 
context referred to by a sentence" , (1989:259). The child 
classifies psych verbs as agent-theme verbs whose arguments are 
predictably linked to grammatical positions of subject and object. 
The authors point out that the significant factor for the child 
using these verbs is not their syntactic behavior, but their 
relational behavior. By this they mean the way in which the 
arguments participate in the event named by the verb. 
Conspicuously absent from the Tinker, Beckwith & Dougherty 
(1989) study is data which might support an unaccusative account of 
psych verbs, such as that presented by Grimshaw (1990) and Belletti 
& Rizzi (1988). The children in the Tinker, Beckwith & Dougherty 
study did not make the errors which might be expected if linking 
for FRIGHTEN verbs were problematic. In fact, the writers 
themselves argue against the purportedly exceptional nature of 
psychological FRIGHTEN verbs with respect to linking. For the most 
part, errors with linking experiencer arguments were few. 
5. Mental Events and Causality 
In this section, I describe the implications of the acquisition 
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data analysis for work in lexical semantics. The lexical semantic 
structures I suggest support the ideas of Beckwith (1989), Johnson 
(1982), and others concerning children's developing theories of 
mind. 
Tinker, Beckwith & Dougherty (1989) hypothesize that, as a 
child learns English, the only way she can understand a FRIGHTEN 
verb is in its agentive sense. The relation between the agent and 
the experiencer (just as the relation between the agent and the 
patient) is one of causality: The agent causes the experiencer to 
experience a certain psychological state. They propose that when 
the child is older she understands that inanimate theme arguments 
used as subjects of these verbs can also be interpreted as causal, 
and she learns to- link participants bearing either role (that is, 
the agent of agentive FRIGHTEN or the theme of the non-agentive 
FRIGHTEN) to the subject position. In this analysis then, the 
child learns to use agentive FRIGHTEN verbs first; learning to use 
non-agentive FRIGHTEN verbs involves assimilating the non-agentive 
therne-experiencer role frame to the agent-experiencer role frame. 
Children need to learn, in other words, that theme subjects can be 
a kind of abstract, non-active agent. Agents and themes are both 
causes of the event denoted by the verb. This process of 
assimilation is not unlike the child's developing sense of 
causality as well as the child's developing sense of the mind. 
Bloom & Beckwith (1989) point out that mothers of young 
children do not often use emotion words when talking about 
emotional events. What these researchers found was that the 
mothers instead "talked about the situations that were the causes, 
consequences, and circumstances of their children's emotional 
expression" (1989:335). Bloom & Beckwith argue that, well before 
they learn the words to express causality, such as because and why, 
children are able to talk about "causal connections entailed. in 
emotional experience" (p. 337). In fact, Bloom & Capatides (1987) 
argue that it is through talking about these emotional events that 
children begin to understand causality itself. As far as feelings 
are concerned, children often express feelings through the use of 
facial expressions and other type& of body language (Bloom & 
Beckwith 1989). The ability to use language to express feelings 
evolves as the child grows (Beckwith 1992; Dunn, Bretherton & Munn, 
1987; and Johnson, 1982). 
Beckwith (1992) argues that children first learn to speak of 
emotions as concrete, physical phenomena. These phenomena may even 
be associated with specific body parts. Data collected from my own 
children support this: 
(12) Morn: Jeremy! What are you doing? (He has his baby 
sister in a strangle-hold.) 
Jeremy: Don't worry, MonU'lly. I'm just loving my 
sister (He squeezes harder.) March 91 age: 3;9 
(13) Samantha: (to her dolls) Now if you be good, I 
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will love you very good. 
time-outs. 
And I won't give you any 
October 92 age 2;1 
Both children above are using the FEAR verb love in an 
activity sense. They are not experiencing difficulty with linking. 
The children are also associating the verb with concrete actions, 
not just emotional states. Only when children are older, Beckwith 
writes, do they "learn to locate emotions in their heads" 
(1992:84). He notes that emotions can be polysemous in referring 
to the emotions themselves or to the "eliciting conditions" of the 
emotions, that is, to the concrete action of the experiencer or to 
the experiencer as the affected object. The verb love in (12) 
refers to the action of the experiencer: for Jeremy, loving his 
sister refers to~ the act of squeezing as much as it does to 
whatever feeling may be within him. 
What appears to be the child's developing ability to use psych 
verbs in increasingly abstract ways is consistent with the child's 
developing sense of the mind (Beckwith 1992). Johnson (1982) 
argues that the development of children• s language about mental 
states may not be quite as smooth a progression from external 
events to internal events as Beckwith suggests, but it certainly 
develops as the child ages. Johnson also argues that even young 
children have a partial understanding of cognitive events and acts. 
His position is consistent with Gentner's (1978) in that he argues 
that mental verbs first refer to relations, and only later to 
actual mental entities. This is evident below, where Samantha's 
focus is on what Robbie did, not on how she perceived what he did. 
(14) Mom: (at a Halloween party) What's wrong, Samantha? 
Samantha: (crying) Robbie scared me. On purpose. 
Mom: What did he do? 
Samantha: He scared me, Mommy. 
Mom: Did his mask frighten you? 
Samantha: Yes. Robbie scared me on purpose. 
(Oct. 92, age 2;2) 
The context behind this example is that Robbie, who was 
wearing a scary mask, simply turned to look at Samantha. Although 
her perception is that he intentionally did something to scare her, 
that is not what happened; she simply reacted to the mask. Yet her 
only way of articulating this incident is to claim that Robbie 
actually did something causal. She doesn't really rise to the bait 
when Mom asks, "Did his mask scare you'?" She insists that the boy 
did something to scare her intentionally. As the next section of 
this paper will argue, the differences between the two types of 
subject arguments--the mask and Robbie--is an important one 
semantically as well as developmentally. 
6. Subject Arguments as Experienced Events 
6.1. Two Types of Subjects 
Bouchard (1995) distinguishes between subjects as concepts and 
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subjects as Intentional-Subjects (I-Subjects), arguing that these 
different types of subjects are associated with different types of 
events, analogous to Pustejovsky's (1995) direct causation and 
experienced causation. Bouchard (1995) points out that psych 
constructions are extremely productive in many languages, and that 
regular verbs are used frequently in psychological ways. His often 
cited example is strike. 
(15)a. 
(15)b. 
The book struck Mary as interesting. 
The book struck Mary on the head. 
Bouchard points out that there is an essential difference between 
the two subject participants: one is an entity, the other is simply 




The boy (intentionally) frightened Samantha. 
The mask frightened Samantha. 
In the first example, the subject acts as an Intentional-subject--
an agent--to cause the reaction denoted by the verb. In the second 
example, the mask does nothing. In fact, it is not actually the 
mask which frightens Samantha at all, but it is her mental 
experience of the mask which frightens her; in this sentence, the 
subject is not an entity, but a concept. It becomes linked to the 
subject position because it is associated with causing the mental 
state, but it is simply the idea of the mask that frightens the 
child. 
6.2. Two Types of Causatives 
Bouchard's idea above is similar to that of Pustejovsky (1995) 
who argues that experiencer predicates always have an experiencing 
event in the subject position. He distinguishes between direct 
causation for regular causatives and experienced causation for 
psychological causatives. What this means is that in the lexical 
semantic representation of the causing event of psych verbs, there 
is at some level a representation of the experiencer's experience 
of the argument linked to the subject position. 
In a very general way, causatives usually have one of the 
following logical structures. 
(17) [DO (x)] CAUSE [BECOME (y <frightened>)] 
(18) [DO (x,y)] CAUSE [BECOME (y <frightened>)] 
The representation in (17) means that x is engaged in an activity 
that causes a second related event which is named by the verb in 
the primitive <frightened>. The representation in (18) is slightly 
different in that it seems to encode something like agency in which 
x acts upon y to cause the event named by the verb. Neither of 
these representations seem able to encode this idea of the subject 
as concept (Bouchard 1995) or the idea of experienced causation 
(Pustejovsky 1995), what I am generally calling the experienced 
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event. I suggest the following logical structure to describe this 
type of subject. 
(19) [Xe] CAUSE [BECOME (y <frightened>)] 
This simply approximates the insight the x represents an 
experienced event, what is in Pustejovsky's (1995) formulation 
experienced causation, represented at some level in the following 
way. 
(20) [EXPERIENCE (y,x)] CAUSE [BECOME (y <frightened>)) 
I suggest--following the insights of Pustejovsky {1995) and 
Bouchard (1995) --that a representation such as (19) obviates the 
need for an accoont of psych verbs to appeal to the notion of 
unaccusativity. Such a representation can account for both the 
linking and the binding problems. 
7. Application to Problems 
This notion of the experienced event as the subject argument can 
help account for the problems associated with psych verbs as well 
as explain the late-error data from Bowerman (1990) in examples 
(8)- (10). 
Bowerman suggests that the girls are using FEAR verbs in the 
FRIGHTEN verb pattern simply because it is the predominant pattern 
in English. But I believe that there is something more to this 
data: the girls could be acquiring more sophisticated lexical 
semantic structures. These errors are exactly the sort which would 
be expected if the girls were, in fact, learning to link the 
experienced event to subject position. That is, these would be 
expected errors if the children were in the process of learning the 
difference between subjects as Intentional subjects and subjects as 
concepts. What they may be doing here is actually viewing the 
subject argument as the experienced event [EXPERIENCE (x, y)] as 
they would with a FRIGHTEN verb. This is, after all, the 
productive use of psychological verbs in English (e.g. strike me as 
interesting) . 
My suggestion that this data reflects the children acquiring 
the abstract sub-eventual structure of the EXPERIENCE constant is 
consistent with work on children's acquisition of causality with 
respect to emotions, as well as with work on children's developing 
the ability to perceive and use abstractions discussed in earlier 
sections. 
The binding problem may also be viewed differently if the 
events represented by the subject arguments of psych verbs are 
either intentional events or experienced events. Binding theory 
applies when subjects of psych verbs are intentional subjects, that 
is, when they are agentive, as in (6a-b) above. Binding theory 
does not appear to hold for concept subjects of psych verbs, what 
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Pustejovsky (1995) calls experienced causation. But, in effect, 
binding does apply at a level of semantic representation such as 
that in (20) : concept subjects require the representation of the 
experiencer in the event denoted by the subject argument. At such 
a level, the arguments and anaphors in (6c-d) may be said to be 
bound to one another (Pustejovsky 1995) . 
8. Conclusion 
Exceptional lexical semantic representations typically attributed 
to psych verbs cannot be supported by the quite unexceptional ways 
in which children acquire these verbs. Children's acquisition of 
psych verbs seems to be consistent with the process of acquiring 
increasing levels of abstraction; I argue that there is evidence of 
this in child language data. This paper supports theories of 
lexical semantics which do not rely on accepted semantic role 
hierarchies, but instead on event-related properties of words. 
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